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Abstract
Influenza A viruses are believed to spread between humans through contact, large respiratory 
droplets and small particle droplet nuclei (aerosols), but the relative importance of each of these 
modes of transmission is unclear. Volunteer studies suggest that infections via aerosol 
transmission may have a higher risk of febrile illness. Here we apply a mathematical model to data 
from randomized controlled trials of hand hygiene and surgical face masks in Hong Kong and 
Bangkok households. In these particular environments, inferences on the relative importance of 
modes of transmission are facilitated by information on the timing of secondary infections and 
apparent differences in clinical presentation of secondary infections resulting from aerosol 
transmission. We find that aerosol transmission accounts for approximately half of all 
transmission events. This implies that measures to reduce transmission by contact or large droplets 
may not be sufficient to control influenza A virus transmission in households.
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Influenza A viruses are believed to spread between humans through exposure to respiratory 
droplets expelled during coughing or sneezing from infectious individuals. A distinction is 
typically made between larger droplets that are believed to settle to ground within 1–2 
meters, versus smaller droplet nuclei particles with aerodynamic diameter below 5μm (1–4) 
that can remain airborne for longer periods but may desiccate quickly, depending on 
environmental conditions. These latter particles are also referred to as aerosols and retain 
infectivity (4). The relative importance of contact, droplet and aerosol transmission of 
influenza viruses in humans has not been established, making it difficult to develop 
evidence-based infection control policies in various settings (5).
Influenza viruses can survive for hours on non-porous surfaces, but are not thought to 
survive long on hands (6, 7). Influenza viral RNA can be detected in the household 
environment of infected individuals, and hand hygiene can reduce environmental 
contamination (8). Hand hygiene has appeared to reduce but not eliminate transmission in 
some studies but not others (9–12), suggesting that contact spread has a partial role in 
influenza virus transmission.
In studies of exhaled breath particles from healthy subjects during tidal breathing, 
concentrations of particles vary from 1 to >10,000 particles per liter, with the majority less 
than 0.3μm in diameter (13). Infectious virus and viral RNA can be detected in both larger 
particles >5μm and smaller particles <5μm (14–16).
Experimental studies have demonstrated that influenza virus can remain infectious in small 
particle aerosols, and can transit across rooms (17). Influenza viral RNA has been detected 
in a hospital emergency department (18) and aerosol transmission was implicated in a 
hospital outbreak of seasonal influenza (19). These data demonstrate the potential 
contribution of aerosols to influenza transmission. However there is limited empirical 
evidence of aerosol transmission in the literature to date (4). Ferret studies have provided 
evidence supporting the various modes of influenza virus transmission (4), and notably in 
the 1940s one study provided evidence supporting aerosol transmission (20).
Influenza virus infection is associated with a varying spectrum of disease that typically 
ranges from subclinical or asymptomatic to acute febrile acute respiratory illness (21, 22). 
An important observation from human challenge studies is that aerosolized influenza A 
viruses are infectious at low doses, and tend to cause more “typical influenza-like disease” 
(i.e. fever plus cough), than intranasal inoculation which mimics contact and droplet 
transmission (22, 23). Similar observations have also been reported in the ferret model (24). 
This could be explained by infection with small particles in the conducting airways or lower 
respiratory tract, eliciting a more vigorous host response characterized by fever and 
coughing. This leads to the hypothesis that influenza A virus infections initiated by aerosol 
transmission could have a different clinical presentation on average than infections by the 
contact or droplet route, and that aerosol spread would be more likely to manifest in fever 
plus cough. Differing clinical presentation depending on the primary site of infection is 
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thought to occur for other infectious diseases, for example smallpox, and Milton suggested 
the term ‘anisotropic’ for infections with this property (25).
Based on the hypothesis that average clinical presentation differed depending on the mode 
of transmission, we developed a mathematical model to permit inference on the contribution 
of each mode to transmission of influenza A virus in households from data from two 
randomized controlled trials of surgical masks and hand hygiene, in Hong Kong and 
Bangkok. We found that aerosol transmission accounted for approximately half of all 
transmission events. This implies that measures to reduce transmission by contact or large 
droplets may not be sufficient to control influenza A virus transmission in households.
RESULTS
Descriptive analysis
In total, the studies in Hong Kong and Bangkok included successful follow-up of 275 and 
507 index cases with confirmed influenza A, respectively (Supplementary Tables S1–S2). 
There was no statistically significant difference between study arms in the risk of confirmed 
influenza A virus infections in household contacts, and initial reports of those studies 
concluded that these interventions could have had at most a small effect on overall 
transmission (11, 12). In both studies, household contacts with confirmed influenza A virus 
infection had slightly higher but non-significant risks of fever plus cough in the intervention 
arms compared to the control arm (Supplementary Table S3). However, when the 
cumulative incidence of confirmed influenza infections were plotted for household contacts, 
we identified a change in the risk of fever plus cough that was particularly apparent in the 
households in Bangkok (Figure 1, Supplementary Figure S1). These changes are consistent 
with our hypothesis that hand hygiene and face mask interventions would reduce contact and 
large droplet transmission, increasing the contribution of aerosol transmission in the 
intervention arms which consequently led to an increased risk of fever plus cough among the 
confirmed infections in household contacts in the intervention arms.
Modes of transmission
Fitting the transmission model to the data from each study, we found that under a wide range 
of assumed efficacies of hand hygiene and face masks, aerosol spread remained the 
dominant mode of influenza A virus transmission, with consistency in the estimated 
contribution to overall transmission between the two settings (Figure 2). Under a plausible 
exemplar scenario where randomization to the hand hygiene intervention reduced contact 
transmission by 50% while randomization to face masks plus hand hygiene reduced both 
contact and droplet transmission by 50%, we estimated that in the control arm aerosol 
transmission contributed to 51% of secondary infections in Hong Kong and 42% of 
secondary infections in Bangkok (Table 1, Supplementary Figure S2). Varying the assumed 
efficacy of each intervention from 0% to 100% led to ranges for the estimated contribution 
of aerosol transmission of approximately 25% to 85% in Hong Kong and 25% to 75% in 
Bangkok (Figure 2). Priors and posteriors for the fitted model are shown in Supplementary 
Figures S3–S4, and model diagnostics are plotted in Supplementary Figures S5–S8. 
Sensitivity analyses with a broad range of alternative model formulations supported these 
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observations (Supplementary Methods, Supplementary Tables S4–S10, Supplementary 
Figures S9–S16).
DISCUSSION
Our results suggest that aerosol transmission is an important mode and possibly the 
predominant mode of influenza A virus transmission in households. Aerosol transmission 
was estimated to account for approximately half of all transmission events, suggesting that 
influenza A virus transmission among household members may not be controlled by 
interventions against contact or droplet transmission (4, 26). Our findings were derived from 
households in tropical and sub-tropical settings but the proposed framework can be used to 
assess transmission modes in other climates and settings. A comprehensive picture of modes 
of transmission in different settings would facilitate calibration of public health measures, 
which only need to reduce overall transmission by approximately one third, assuming a 
basic reproductive number of approximately 1.5 (27), to achieve control.
Our analysis reveals two important insights into influenza A virus transmission. First, in 
household outbreaks susceptible individuals are at risk of infection via multiple modes, and 
substantive reductions in the risk of infection by one mode may not lead to overall 
reductions in the risk of infection. In the Hong Kong and Bangkok studies, the hand hygiene 
and face mask interventions did not substantially change the overall risk of infection for 
household contacts, but instead may have altered the likely mode of infection with 
consequences for clinical presentation. Second, our model suggests that aerosol transmission 
appears to be an important mode of transmission in households in Hong Kong and Bangkok, 
despite previous hypotheses that aerosol transmission may be suppressed in settings with 
higher humidity (28, 29). Whereas other infections that spread predominantly by the aerosol 
route such as varicella and measles viruses are highly transmissible and can cause explosive 
outbreaks, influenza viruses are not as highly transmissible, with a reproductive number 
typically in the range 1.5–2.0 (30). This could be explained if individuals infected with 
influenza viruses only generate infectious doses at a low rate, so that larger outbreaks would 
only result from prolonged exposures in optimal conditions (4, 31). Assuming that infected 
persons excrete aerosolized virus at a low rate, and given that infectious virus in aerosols are 
rapidly diluted through ventilation and natural decay in the environment, it is likely that the 
greatest risk of aerosol transmission is in close proximity to infected persons (4).
There are some limitations to our analysis. First, our model did not fully account for 
heterogeneity in transmission associated with various host, viral and environmental factors. 
For example, there may be variability in infectiousness between index cases, variability in 
susceptibility to different virus strains, and variability in the hazard of modes of 
transmission depending on proximity and airflow. However, our model captures the 
essential features of transmission, and random allocation of households to the three 
intervention arms should have balanced all other factors between groups so that the 
differences in outcomes between intervention groups are due to the effects of the 
interventions on modes of transmission. We only included data on influenza A virus 
transmission in this article because the literature supporting different clinical presentations 
associated with infections by the aerosol route (22, 23) only provide data on influenza A. 
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Further work could apply similar approaches to influenza B if the same hypothesis regarding 
clinical presentation were thought to apply. Second, our model implicitly assumes that only 
the first infectious exposure is relevant to susceptible contacts, and once infected by that first 
exposure, further exposures are unimportant. Our model could be expanded to allow for 
multiple simultaneous exposures, if it were understood how this might affect clinical 
presentation of consequent infections. Third, it is possible that some secondary influenza 
virus infections were not confirmed due to poor quality specimens collected during home 
visits, or if peak viral shedding in the respiratory tract occurred between home visits at 3-day 
intervals (11, 12). Finally, we did not explicitly account for imperfect adherence to the 
interventions, although the efficacy parameters in our model account for less than 100% 
efficacy against the specific modes of transmission as would be expected under imperfect 
adherence. Further improvements in the model might be obtained by incorporating limited 
data on adherence that was mainly self-reported by participants.
Our results raise a number of questions. First, are there differences in the importance of 
innate, humoral, cell-mediated and mucosal immunity against specific modes of influenza 
virus transmission, or in immune responses to infection?
Experimental results suggest that humoral antibody might be particularly relevant for 
protection against aerosol transmission (22). Second, are there differences in the incubation 
period associated with infection by different modes of transmission? It is thought that the 
minimum infectious dose is lower for infections by the aerosol route (22, 23) but the 
implications on incubation period are unclear. Third, are there consequences from the mode 
of infection on modes of subsequent transmission from an infected and symptomatic (or 
asymptomatic) individual? If so, there would be important implications for the interpretation 
of volunteer challenge and transmission studies (32)? Finally, how would repeated 
exposures to infectious doses of influenza viruses, particularly within a short time frame 
after the first exposure, affect subsequent risk of clinical disease and clinical presentation? 
As some genetic factors have been identified as risk factors for severe influenza disease (33, 
34), what is the role of such factors in influencing milder clinical diseases versus no illness 
by different modes of influenza virus transmission?
Further work could examine differences in modes of influenza virus transmission by host, 
viral and environmental factors, in other geographical locations, and in other closed 
environments including schools and health care settings. In particular, there is some 
evidence that absolute humidity influences aerosol transmission (28, 29, 35), and our results 
lead to the corollary that the clinical presentation of influenza virus infections could vary 
over time according to variation in humidity. On the technical side, further work could 
explore the use of alternative modeling approaches including dependent competing risk 
models.
In conclusion, our findings suggest that household contacts of persons with symptomatic 
influenza virus infection are at risk of infection by multiple modes, and that aerosol 
transmission is important. This is suggestive of the need for further studies into personal 
preventive measures for the control of influenza; although our observations suggest that 
hand hygiene and surgical face masks may not provide high levels of protection against 
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influenza virus transmission in these settings. Having identified that aerosol transmission is 
important in households, appropriate control measures in this setting could include improved 
ventilation to dilute and remove aerosols more quickly, the use of humidifiers or ultraviolet 
light to reduce the viability of aerosols, and isolation of sick individuals in separate rooms 
(26, 28). The importance of aerosol transmission implies that the definition of “contact” in 
epidemiological studies of influenza virus transmission may need to be reconsidered, 
perhaps by accounting for proximity and duration of contact. Whereas our findings offer 
new insights in understanding and preventing influenza transmission in a confined space, the 
relative contribution of each mode of transmission has yet to be clarified in other 
geographical locations and different transmission settings. Our model also enables more 
detailed analyses of the effects of host factors (e.g. age, innate, humoral and mucosal 
immunity), differences between virus strains, and environmental factors (temperature, 
humidity, air currents) in varying the importance of each mode of transmission.
METHODS
Sources of Data
In Hong Kong and Bangkok during 2008–2011, large randomized controlled trials were 
conducted to investigate the efficacy of surgical face masks and enhanced hand hygiene in 
reducing transmission of influenza in households (11, 12). The two studies shared very 
similar protocols as outlined below, and minor differences between the two studies are 
clarified in Supplementary Table S11.
In each study, index cases were enrolled as local residents presenting for medical care with 
illness consistent with an acute upper respiratory tract infection, and living in a household 
with at least two other individuals of whom none had reported upper respiratory tract 
infections in the preceding 14 days. Nasal and throat swabs (NTS) were collected and 
pooled for testing with the QuickVue Influenza A+B rapid diagnostic test (Quidel Corp., 
San Diego, CA) using the manufacturer’s sterile foam swabs. Those subjects with a positive 
result on the rapid test were randomized and further followed up. Data on clinical signs and 
symptoms were collected for all subjects, and an additional pooled NTS specimen was 
collected for subsequent reference testing.
Households were randomized in equal proportions to one of three groups: control, control 
plus hand hygiene, or control plus hand hygiene plus surgical face masks. Supplementary 
Table S12 provides specific details of the three interventions applied in each study. 
Following randomization a home visit was scheduled to implement the intervention, collect 
baseline demographic data and NTS specimens from all household members aged ≥2 years, 
and to describe the information to be recorded in daily symptom diaries. Further home visits 
were scheduled around 3 and 6 days after the baseline home visit to check symptom diaries, 
monitor adherence to interventions, and collect NTS specimens from all household members 
regardless of illness.
All NTS specimens were tested by RT-PCR for influenza A and B viruses using standard 
methods as described elsewhere (7, 8). Only the households of index cases with confirmed 
influenza A virus infection are included in the present analyses. The primary outcome 
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measure was the secondary infection risk at the individual level i.e. the proportion of 
household contacts that had influenza virus infection confirmed by RT-PCR during follow-
up. Written informed consent was provided by all subjects 18 years of age and older, and 
proxy written consent from parents or legal guardians was obtained for children. The studies 
were approved by Institutional Review Boards in Hong Kong and Bangkok respectively.
Statistical Analysis
We constructed a mathematical model that accounted for the alternative modes of 
transmission (Supplementary Methods, Supplementary Tables S13–S15, Supplementary 
Figure S17) and used it to analyze the observed time intervals between primary and 
secondary cases, the frequency of secondary transmission in households and the risk of 
presentation with fever plus cough among confirmed secondary cases. Since the observation 
of household transmission was truncated at around 7 days since illness onset in each index 
case, we assumed that all of observed secondary cases resulted from actual secondary 
transmission. We estimated the cumulative hazards of infection with or without fever in 
each study arm using the Nelson-Aalen non-parametric estimator. Using the competing risk 
model described in the Supplementary Information, we allowed household contacts to 
experience competing hazards of infection by three alternative modes, and time to infection 
in each mode followed a Weibull distribution with an identical shared shape parameter and 
mode-specific scale parameters. Infection via one mode was sufficient to confer immunity 
against any further infection. In households with one or more secondary case, we assumed 
independent hazards of infection from each infected person in a household for the remaining 
contacts. Some household contacts were assumed to be immune to infection by any mode, 
and we jointly estimated the proportion of initially immune children and adults with other 
parameters. We assumed that randomization to the hand hygiene intervention reduced the 
risk of contact transmission, and the addition of surgical face masks also reduced the risk of 
droplet transmission independently. Moreover, we assumed a different risk of fever plus 
cough following infection with each mode of transmission. Quantifying each hazard of 
secondary transmission, we computed the cause-specific probability of aerosol transmission 
to express the relative contribution of aerosol transmission among all three modes. Data 
from the Hong Kong study and statistical syntax in the R language to permit reproduction of 
these analyses are available at the corresponding author’s website [http://www.hku.hk/
bcowling/influenza/HK_NPI_study.htm].
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1. Risk of infection and illness in household contacts
Cumulative hazards of confirmed influenza A virus infections presenting with fever plus 
cough or not presenting with fever plus cough, in household contacts in 275 and 507 
households in Hong Kong and Bangkok, respectively. Increases in the risk of confirmed 
infection with fever plus cough, and decreases in the risk of confirmed infection without 
fever plus cough, are particularly apparent in the intervention arms compared to the control 
arm in Bangkok.
Cowling et al. Page 10













Figure 2. The cause-specific probabilities of aerosol transmission
The relative importance of aerosol transmission in households in Hong Kong and Bangkok, 
quantified in terms of the cause-specific probability of aerosol transmission. The contour 
lines show the proportion of secondary influenza virus infections attributed to aerosol 
transmission in the control arm of each study, under varying assumptions about the efficacy 
of randomization to the hand hygiene and surgical mask interventions in reducing contact 
(x-axis) and droplet (y-axis) transmission respectively. The parameter estimates in Table 1 
correspond to the exemplar plausible assumption that randomization to the hand hygiene and 
face mask interventions led to 50% reductions in contact and droplet transmission 
respectively from the time of application of those interventions, which corresponds to the 
centroid of each panel.
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Table 1
Parameter estimates for the model of modes of transmission
Point estimates and 95% credible intervals of model parameters under an exemplar plausible scenario that 
hand hygiene and surgical face masks reduced contact and droplet transmission respectively by 50% from the 
time of application of those interventions.
Parameters Hong Kong (275 households with 822 
contacts)
Bangkok (507 households with 1,266 
contacts)
Estimate (95% CI) Estimate (95% CI)
φ Shape of the Weibull distribution 1.41 (1.05, 1.79) 1.38 (1.14, 1.61)
λ1 Force of contact transmission* 0.16 (0.01, 0.41) 0.17 (0.01, 0.32)
λ2 Force of droplet transmission* 0.11 (0.00 0.30) 0.13 (0.01, 0.28)
λ3 Force of aerosol transmission* 0.28 (0.07, 0.42) 0.22 (0.11, 0.32)
π1 Risk of fever plus cough for infections by contact route 22% (1%, 51%) 26% (1%, 66%)
π2 Risk of fever plus cough for infections by droplet route 23% (1%, 58%) 33% (2%, 73%)
π3 Risk of fever plus cough for infections by aerosol route 53% (33%, 92%) 77% (55%, 98%)
θ1 Proportion of household adults immune/not exposed 88% (84%, 91%) 74% (71%, 78%)
θ2 Proportion of household children immune/not exposed 80% (72%, 88%) 69% (61%, 76%)
*
The forces of infection in combination with a shared shape parameter determine the hazard associated with each competing mode of transmission. 
The relative contribution of each mode j is calculated as the cause-specific probabilities .
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